How to cite this paper: Maune, A. (2017) This article presents an examination of the emergence and coevolution of startups and venture capital that led to the transformation of Israel into a Start-Up and Innovation Nation since its inception in 1948. Throughout, the co-evolution of startups and venture capital was considered a critical linkage between venture capital emergence and startup intensive cluster. The article also examined the three phased evolutionary model of 1969 to 2000. A discursive approach of related relevant literature was used. The study found out that the co-evolution of startups and venture capital, policy targeting and a network of a number of other factors as will be discussed in the three phased evolutionary model were critical to the emergence and change of the Israeli high-technology industry into a high-technology startup intensive industry. Israel has become the second largest world market for venture capital with more than 240 venture capitals since 1992. Israel has also become the lead in research and development attracting more than 270 multinational companies with more than 250 establishing research centers and employing over 108 000 in the country. The study also found that Israel leads other nations in per capita startups, engineers, scientists and technicians. This article will be critical for policy formulation and implementation especially in Emerging Markets. This article may lead to a shift in strategy in many emerging countries. This article will also help expand the academic knowledge by filling the existing gaps within the body of knowledge. Therefore, the article has academic, economic and policy value.
INTRODUCTION
Ideas dominate contemporary society. Ideas feed curiosity, govern decisions and fuel the increasingly knowledge-based economy (Ellison, 2015) . The startup world houses an industry of ideas, providing mankind with cutting-edge solutions to everyday problems. In recent years, there has been an influx of young people entering the entrepreneurial world through academic programs, accelerators and startups (SUs). These are surfacing at an astonishing rate. All entrepreneurs establishing a SU do so in order to succeed, to "make it big time." What these entrepreneurs lack, however, is knowledge of the crucial ingredients for success. To Ellison (2015) , these entrepreneurs are generally oblivious to their SU`s chances of success. However, not all ideas evolve past their formative stages. Some succeed and some ultimately fail. Ellison (2015) argues that to investors, SUs offer huge opportunities for high returns but alas, the gains exist only in tandem with substantial risk. According to Florida and Kenney (1988:302) , "there is little doubt that venture capital plays a critical role in [SU entrepreneurship] and economic [growth] . Clearly, the vibrance and rapid growth of California's Silicon Valley and BostonRoute 128 area, for example, owe much to the significant amounts of venture capital (VC) available there." They further argue that, "the success stories of high flying SUs like Fairchild, Intel, Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC), Apple Computer, Cray Computer, Sun Microsystems, Genentech, and countless others stand in sharp contrast to the stagnation and decline found in older manufacturing sectors" (pp.302). Florida and Kenney (1988:302) opine that "it is not surprising that both private and public sector actors have become enamored with VC as a mechanism for incubating technology businesses and generating economic growth." of small high-tech firms. The diffusion was also associated with the change-over towards a SU intensive high-technology cluster from a militarydominated industry. Teubal (2006:1478) argue that "when strictly defined Israel`s VC industry in the 1990s became one of the largest VC industries in absolute terms (only second to the U.S.A.) and the largest in relative terms (VC as percentage of GNP)." In their study, found out that VC`s impact on hi-tech was SU and VC co-evolution. Teubal (2006:1480) state that VC became Israel`s central pivot for the advent of the SU high-technology intensive sector. To Avnimelech (2008:81) , previous work "suggests that policy was a central vector in the VC emergence and transformation of Israel`s hitech industry into the SU-intensive model." Teubal, 2006:1480) further argue that the absence of a VC industry with strong coevolutionary effects on SUs suggests the nonemergence or little dispersion of America`s Silicon Valley approach to high-technology outside America until the 90s in Israel.
Israel`s high-technology success SUs has attracted attention of large corporations, and each year around 10-15 Israeli SUs are acquired by global corporations for billions of dollars (Barnea, 2014) . The tremendous success of the growing Israeli technology market has managed to attract a substantial amount of investors from outside to invest directly in Israel`s technology market through foreign VCs, Corporate VCs, and individuals. Maune (2015:179) states that although it is now public knowledge that Israel has the greatest number of per capita SUs than any other country in the world, the fact that it has also the greatest number of per capita technicians, engineers, scientists and PhD holders than any other nation has not yet been public knowledge. Maune (2015:179) further states that the country now leads in research and development (R&D) spending. It has also managed to attract many of the world`s major international companies to open up shop and establish R&D activities as shown in Table 2 below (IMF, 2014). As of 2011 there were 245 R&D centers by foreign companies in Israel and their countries of origin were: U.S.A. (46%), Europe (46%) and the rest of the world (8%). These foreign multinational corporations employed more than 108, 000 employees. SUs and VCs have proved to be of great importance towards economic development and growth. The co-evolution of SUs & VC will provide a tremendous source of the much needed FDIs in Emerging Markets. According to Maune (2015:179) , Israel an Innovation Nation that is smaller than Wales and New Jersey and less than 70 years old with eight million people becomes a typical example that can provide best practices and lessons for Emerging Markets especially African countries to adopt given the successes recorded in the past 68 years. According to the List of Israeli companies quoted on the NASDAQ (2017), "Israel had more companies listed in 2012 on the NASDAQ stock exchange than any [other] country outside the U.S.A., save [for] China. 15 As of 2011, some [60] 15 List of Israeli companies quoted on the Nasdaq. Israeli companies [were] listed on the NASDAQ. 16 [Year 2000] was the year that saw the most new Israeli listings on the exchange -33 companies. 17 Since the 1980s, over 250 Israeli companies had an initial public offering (IPO) on the NASDAQ." Israel has managed to develop a vibrant ecosystem that has spurred a high rate of both technological innovation and entrepreneurship through targeted government policies and initiatives as well as the coevolution of SUs and VC. This article examines Israel`s SUs and VC in developing a competitive advantage as well as exploring lessons that Africa countries can learn.
The remaining sections of this article will be as follows: Section 2 presents a review of literature on Israel`s SU and VC industry, section 3 presents methodology, section 4 presents a discussion of Israel`s SUs and VC, and section 5 concludes by presenting some policy implications.
LITERATURE REVIEW

Start-Up development and funding instruments
The lifeline of any SU is the accessibility to a consistent flow of capital. Throughout a company`s life, a multiple rounds of investment will arise. The first round of investment allows the idea to be translated into a tangible product or solution. Generally, the funding is bootstrapped from the innovators` own pockets along with, if they are lucky, a government or institutional grant. This will be followed by the seed stage, where the investment circle expands to include family members and friends. The SU finally begins to take shape. Investors, usually previously complete strangers to the founder, begin to establish a relationship during this phase. The hope and expectation are that the profit will be substantial, and the reality is that the risks at this point are fairly sizable. As such, these early investors are considered angels. The category of angel investors includes seed VC organizations and crowdfunding 18 platforms. As the company continues to grow and begins to deliver some sort of products, the SU begins to offset some of the initial entry costs. True VC dominates investment during this development phase, where venture money will often be referred to as growth capital. VC assembles portfolios from various ventures, or SUs, usually raising funds from large institutions. Like in other SU investing platforms, VC involves significant risks but also offers potentially above-average returns on investment. For example, funds like Sequoia Capital who invested in Whatsapp, Accel Partners who invested in Facebook (NASDAQ: FB) and Benchmark Capital, early investors in Twitter (NASDAQ: TWTR), all saw massive returns from their early stage, risky initial investments. After this period of growth and profit, assuming the company has been successful 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Crowdfunding is an up-and-coming format for SU investment, allowing investors to build their own SU portfolios rather than buying into rigid funds. Crowdfunding collectivizes the SU investing process, allowing many individuals to invest smaller amounts, forming what is known as the "crowd." There exist two main forms: reward-based and equity-based.
up to this point, the SU eventually reaches maturity, where it goes forward and hopefully generates a substantial amount of profit, gets bought out by a larger company, or floats on a public exchange. Figure 1 below denotes the SU development and funding instruments as well as the enterprise`s revenues per each developmental stage.
Financing channels for the Israeli Start-upintensive cluster
According to IVC and KPMG (2016:1), Israeli technology companies managed to raise USD1.7 billion in the second quarter of 2016, from 187 financing deals. This amount was 55% above the USD1.1 billion that was raised from 174 hi-tech financing rounds in the previous quarter.
19 IVC and KPMG (2016:1) further claims that the largest deal in the quarter was USD300 million that was raised by mobile app company Gett that accounted for 18% of the total proceeds. Even without the Gett deal, capital raised in the second quarter reflects a 27% increase compared to the first quarter of the year. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 24 The 2015 amount was up 36% from the USD2.3 billion raised from 392 VC-backed deals in 2014, and 84% above the USD1.7 billion raised from 393 VC-backed deals in 2013. 25 It seems the increase in capital raised from VC-backed deals can be best explained by the increase in size of the average financing round where VC funds participated. The average VCbacked deal in 2015 reached nearly USD8 million, an unprecedented record, well above the USD5.9 million average in 2014, and much higher than the USD4.4 million average VC-backed deal in 2013. 26 " According to IVC and KPMG (2015:2), "Israeli VC funds have accelerated their activity in 2015 by investing USD653 million, compared with 2014's USD568 million. 27 The amount was, however, below the all-time Israeli VC fund investment record set in 2008 of USD780 million. Looking at the Israeli VC funds` share placed in total capital raised by Israeli hi-tech companies, it has clearly been decreasing in the past decade, reaching its lowest point of 15% in 2015, compared to a 17% share in 2014 and a 30% 10-year average share. 28 However, foreign and other investors increased from 60% in 2006 to 85% in 2015. 29 The increase in capital invested is a direct result of the increase in capital available to investments by local funds, and is also demonstrated in first investments made by Israel`s VC funds in 2015." IVC and KPMG (2015:2) further states that the Israeli VC funds placed a total of USD236 million in first investments, that accounted for 36% of total placements, up from 30% share recorded in both 2013 and 2014.
IVC and KPMG (2015:2) further indicate that, "Seed stage deals have attracted more attention from investors in 2015, with 194 seed companies (27% of deals) bringing in a total of USD269 million (6% of the total capital), an increase in both compared to 2014's 179 seed deals, which totalled USD178 million (5% of the total capital)." The increase in large deals was a result of 78 late stage companies that led capital raising in 2015, with almost USD1.7 billion, an exceptional amount for this stage, that is, 23% increase from 2014. To IVC and KPMG (2015:2), mid-stage companies also attracted USD1.5 billion in 2015 compared to USD884 million in 2014."
Start-Ups established in Israel from 1999 -2014
Israel has managed to establish 10, 185 SUs from 1999 to 2014, of these 4, 358 (42.8%) failed, 5, 347 (52.5%) are running and 480 (4.7%) became successful (see pie chart in figure 4 below). Figure 2 below shows the number of SUs established, failed, running and successful per each year from 1999 to 24 IVC & KPMG (2015) Report (www.ivc-online.com). 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid.
2014. Figure 3 below 
Israel`s Start-Up Ecosystem
In order to build an innovative hi-tech SU-intensive cluster, Israel had to establish and build an ecosystem to support such an industry. Establishing a hi-tech SU ecosystem was basically based on six main components (Getz and Goldberg, 2016) . This is shown in Figure 5 
Foreign Direct Investment
According to Getz and Goldberg (2016:25) , "foreign investors have typically used one of the two options to establish their presence in Israel: they have either set up operations directly, or adopted a strategy of mergers with, or friendly take-overs of, small local companies." Foreign Investor operations have placed much emphasis on establishing R&D facilities as denoted by figure 2 below (Getz and Goldberg, 2016). Getz and Goldberg (2016:25) Getz and Goldberg (2016: [26] [27] state that "the contribution made by multinationals to the development of the Israeli hi-tech industry [in particular the SU cluster] is generally viewed as positive, given the many spillovers to the local economy, such as easy access to international financial and business markets, improved export channels, and the transfer of know-how and managing/marketing skills from the personnel of multinationals to local companies." Getz and Goldberg (2016:27) further add that, "in addition to creating state-of-the-art R&D centers, companies such as Intel and Motorola have established manufacturing facilities, which rapidly became some of the largest private employers in Israel." Getz and Goldberg (2016:27) further state that "in 2003 Intel was employing more than 6,000 workers at its several plants scattered around the country (Haifa, Jerusalem, Kiryat Gat, Petach Tikva, and Yakum), and has developed into one of the top Israeli exporters, with a volume of USD1.6 billion in 2003, equivalent to 13% of total Israeli electronic exports." By December 2014, Intel had 10,500 employees and exported USD4.5 billion. To Getz and Goldberg (2016), the linkages that exist between Intel and Israel are very strong as evidenced by the existence of multibillion dollar world class research and innovation investments.
Israeli Hi-Tech Exits Analysis
According to IVC -Meitar hi-tech exits H1/2016 report, Israeli hi-tech exit activity has accelerated. It has reached USD3.32 billion in 45 deals. It reached 41% of the total exit proceeds in 2015 (USD8.04 billion) and 43% of the total proceeds in 2014 (USD7.78 billion). The average exit deal was USD74 million in H1/2016, slightly above the USD72 million annual average in 2015. The number of exists in H1/2016 reached 41% of the 2015 figure and 37% of the deals in 2014. According to IVC -Meitar Exits Report for the first six months of 2016, the current rate supports a projected annual figure of around 100 deals and an estimated total of USD7 billion in exits. Israeli high-technology IPO activity has plunged to a single company, which raised just under USD6 million, that is, 0.2% of the total H1/2016 exit proceeds. The company that went public was TrendIT. The IPO took place on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) at USD17.6 million at the valuation time of IPO. Table 3 Table 4 below the M&As of Israel`s hi-tech companies since 2006 while Table 5 shows the largest M&A deals in 2015. Investor evaluation of VC fund performance is a bit more scientific. Individual fund performance can be assessed through various ratios, such as the internal rate of return and distributions to paid-in capital. In regard to a country's VCs in the aggregate, a simple but key measure of VC performance can be used. This is the exits to investment ratio, which relates the value of VC-backed M&As to the total of VC-backed investments. Looking at Israel's performance on this basis, observers can see a dramatic improvement in investment results that reflect the large number of acquisitions of Israeli SUs by overseas companies. Table 6 below shows the exits to investment ratios from 2003 to 2013. In 2010 the ratio was 1:1. In 2013, the ratio expanded to 2.5:1. That was a striking result and a more positive reflection of the strength of Israel's VC sector, which -in contrast to its early years -has reached a high level of sophistication and maturity. Tellingly, when the ratios of exits to investments in Israel and exits to investments in the United States are compared, Israel comes out on top. Figure 6 shows Israel on pole position with a 15.42% average on a yearly basis with a significant drop in 2007. Hi-tech exports provide a health source of FDIs for a country unlike most African countries that rely on external loans that comes with interest and prescriptions. 
Hi-Tech Exports
Figure 6 below compares Israel with other three countries from Africa. The World Bank (2015) in Maune (2015:188) defines high-technology exports as products with high R&D intensity. Such products are usually found in electrical engineering, aerospace, computer and software technology, scientific instruments and pharmaceuticals. The graph in
Scaling Up the Israeli Startups
Innovation is driven by many factors that include the tripartite role played by academic institutions, private sector and government. 
METHODOLOGY
This article extensively discussed the Israeli experience, using literature, in leading to its competitive advantage through hi-tech oriented entrepreneurial system or cluster as a result of the co-evolution of SUs and VC in the 1990s. This discussion is, however, based on the VC market and SU intensive cluster conceptual framework that reflects a strategic and competitive innovation policy. Without weakening other approaches by other researchers ( Senor and Singer (2009:60) , the current embargoes against Israel by the Arab States are political, ideological as well as legally the most bold, dangerous, complex and prolonged in nature. How Israel which was attacked seven times in the first 60 years of its existence and subjected to comprehensive diplomatic and economic embargoes has positioned itself global knowledge and innovation economy? How the Israeli companies despite all these challenges have managed to firmly integrated into economies of China, India, U.S.A., 35 Christopher Joyner, quoted in Aaron J. Sarna Europe and Latin America? According to Senor and Singer (2009:11-12 ), Israel`s VC market investment per capita was 350 times higher than that of India, 80 times higher than that of China, 30 times higher than that of Europe and 2.5 times higher than that of the U.S.A. in 2008. Israeli 2015 exports totalled USD53.4 billion an increase compared to USD47.9 billion in 2014. High-tech exports accounted for USD22.5 billion, compared to USD19.9 billion in 2014. Exports to the European Union amounted to USD13.8 billion, Asia USD11.6 billion and U.S.A. USD10.7 billion. All these achievements if not miracles will provide the much needed solutions for Emerging Markets` problems given the vast natural and human resources that it is endowed with as it travels the journey towards attaining its 2063 aspirations for economic development. Following is a discussion of some of the findings of this research study. 
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
Start Up and Venture Capital three phased evolutionary model
A SU/VC co-existence approach is critical in calling for linkages of long term policies, prioritisation and formulation of policies as well as harmonising policy formulation and prioritisation. Teubal (2013:10) provides the numerical indicators of the evolutionary process leading to the Israeli SU and VC cluster. Some of these features are summarized in Table 10 below.
Phase 1 (1969-84) -the background conditions. This period was so critical towards Israel`s SU intensive cluster embedded with a VC market. It marked the beginning of a transformative three phased evolutionary model in Israel. The period saw Israel`s R&D and innovation diffusion. The national concern during this period was the financing of R&D in firms which were overwhelmingly small to medium enterprises at the time. Twenty one (21) Phase 2 (1985 Phase 2 ( -1992 was the Pre-Emergence period that strengthened the ties between private sector, academia and government through R&D linkages, SU/VC experimentations as well as through supporting the ICT sector. This was done through expanding technological infrastructure that included R&D and Science laboratories. The expansion was also done through inculcating existing personnel as well as attracting migrant engineers, technicians as well as scientists among others through employment creation. The period marked the emanation of an Israeli SU/VC marvel, a revolution in technology that gave assurance to a continuous flow of breakthroughs for SU/VC and a constant supply of high-technology technocrats from the IDF as well as migrant technocrats especially those from Russia. The innovation and technology policy programs which were launched during this period included: Inbal (1991), Magnet Program (1992) and Technological Incubators (1992). Teubal (2013:12) felt that the combined effect of the activities in this phase as well as the increase in private sector R&D resulted in the early 1990s SU increase.
To Teubal (2013:12-13), during this phase only government supported VCs and other initiatives existed with no professional or private VC market in existence. The following support initiatives existed to SUs; angels, OCS subsidies, private owned VCs though very few, tax concessions, VC that financed group projects only. This phase resulted in the formation of about 300 SUs by 1992 with a few IPOs offered at NASDAQ stock exchange. This saw an increase in VC activities. Then the availability of funds through Yozma in 1993 triggered a worthy SU/VC co-existence that was driven by the market. The existence of good external factors such as the liberation of the world communications industry, stimulation of the ICT sector as well as the influx of technical skills brought by migrants from Russia contributed in a positive manner towards the strength of private, academia and government R&D linkages as well as the SU/VC experimentations. Phase 3 (1993 Phase 3 ( -2000 : Emergence (of SUintensive cluster and VC market). This phase saw the unveiling of the Yozma program (a VC funding program), targeting VC, ICT and high technology clusters. Israel`s VC market and SU-intensive cluster that begun in the late 90s saw an increased growth in a number of areas that include; SUs, VCs ICT employees, productivity, technocrats, IPOs as well as M&As (Teubal, 2013:13).
Israeli Government`s Yozma Program
The period 1980 saw Israel experiencing economic challenges such as high inflation, macroeconomic meltdown as well as unemployment with the security sector laying off many technocrats, that is, engineers, technicians and scientists. Many among these found new heavens in SU creation with very few of them (SUs) surviving the turbulent economic environment. By the end of 1980, the government of Israel then realised that its R&D support initiatives were failing due to either system nor market failures. This, however, resulted in SUs formation and development failure. These failures were not as a result of inadequate financial follow-up resources for R&D but were due to lack of knowledge and expertise in some cases as a result of managerial incapability as well as lack of SU support by independent players especially regarding integrated financing and unavailability of value added support that usually follow the early VC phase. Officials in Treasury and OCS departments were then prompted to find solutions to these challenges. The process kicked off with consultants in Israel as well as in America. Key individuals with experience and knowledge in the field were consulted. These consultations resolved that the only way to go was to formulate a home grown VC sector that became the government`s strategic priority. The Israeli government had to shift its policy towards the formulation of a home grown VC sector and promoting R&D in high-technology firms as well as promoting the creation, development and growth of SUs and finally promoting a SU-intensive cluster and VC market. This process (consultation) is very critical in policy formulation.
The migrants from Russia during the 90s became a priority focus area for government of Israel as it looked for opportunities to channel the skilled labour from Russia, who came in their thousands, into the main stream economy. Amongst them were technicians, medical doctors, engineers, Why did Yozma Program become so successful? Yozma became a success because it was a home grown revolutionary VC policy initiative that triggers the evolution of the VC market SU-intensive cluster and also due to its specific features. Yozma`s features include; the program was fully financed by government to the tune of USD100 million with USD80 million being a fund of funds that targeted early stage (limited partnerships) and private VCs. The fund also provided incentives as well as requiring a financial institution or foreign investor of repute. Yozma was, however, a catalytic program that saw the USD100 million government investment recouped by 1998. Government had to privatise its share in Yozma`s private funds (that is, USD20 million). Treasury`s direct cost became nil. However, for a detailed and critical argument on the originality of Yozma, see Teubal (2013:23) .
How did Yozma differ from other processes or approaches in the world? Saxenian (1998) and Breshnahan et al. (2001 & 2008) all cited in Teubal (2013:23) provide some interesting incites regarding Yozma`s approach. Literature provides that the Yozma approach was different from other processes and approaches in the world in a significant way thereby rendering it a very unique program in its approach. For example, Yozma differed with the Silicon Valley approach in its emergence phase as the latter takes into account VC as one more input that is critical for a SU-intensive cluster`s effective operation. Israel`s technology sectors and Yozma experiences suggest that in the emergence phase, not all inputs are similarly vital due to the vibrant process associated with that phase. Early stage VC plays an important role in the emergence phase due to SUs of high quality. The co-evolution and existence of SU/VC results in the attraction of external factors that are critical to the whole process as these leads to collective methods that are nourished by reputational outcomes that enhances the local presence of investors, bankers, private VCs as well as other important visible agents with all of them adding to the whole. The Yozma Program was very critical to VC and SU co-evolution.
Start-Up and VC co-evolution
The study shows that the variables influencing SUs and VC market have something in common amongst them given all the three phases of evolution. These variables have linkages that influence the SU-VC formation in these defined three stages which linkages connect the phases in a chain-like formation. The SU/VC co-evolution is thereby not independent from other economic sectors. Profiling of SU/VC becomes easier as the identity of causes of these profiles is easily identified. Moreover, financial institutions are very critical to the formation and emergence of high-technology, hence the need to develop these financial institutions and systems that are critical in facilitating the emergence and development of high-technology. Results of U.S.A. and Israel`s SU and VC sectors show that the sector cannot survive on its own. There are other factors that are important and required before the VC formation. Teubal (2006:1491) , however, argue that a high level of high-technology activity, high-technology innovation as well as other positive surroundings or circumstances are critical before the VC formation for it to become a success.
Avnimelech and Teubal (2006) `s SU and VC coevolutionary article provides an analysis of several relevant 'chains' of interactions. These include demand and supply, strong user-producer learning linkages as well as re-configuration of hightechnology due to a wide indirect influence. Teubal (2006:1492) state that "there are several 'sources' of SUs." Stuart and Sorenson (2003) in Teubal (2006:1492) , argue that although SUs that are formed by the country`s nationals coming from abroad, University graduates and other spillovers from the military are very critical, research has shown that experience gained through working in MNCs, for example, has proved to be a major source of critical managerial and innovative skills that are necessary for SU formation and development. According to Teubal (2006:1492) , Klepper (2001) and Gompers et al. (2003) have supported this notion by coining the term 'entrepreneurial spawning,' that is, the laying, breeding as well as generation of entrepreneurship. To Teubal (2006:1492) , many well established corporates have provided breeding and grooming grounds for personnel capability development critical for new VC entrants.
The early 80s marked Israel`s starting point for SU/VC co-existence with opportunities emanating from ICT and Software development that provided a firm foundation for SUs as well as the development of unique SU models. These new models had linkages to new financing models that included limited partnerships between foreign investors and the OCS, investment bankers financing hightechnology firms and initiatives as well as the VCAtena founded in 1985. The growth of NASDAQ stock exchange in 1993, the globalisation of hightechnology stock markets as well as the ongoing innovations created a more advanced SU process that emanated in the early 90s. Teubal (2006:1492) "estimate that by 1993 more than 300 SUs were already operating in Israel." However, before Yozma and the development of the VC market, demand had already been high for VC activities. This demand was, however, triggered by policy targeting that saw the unveiling by government of the Yozma program which market systems had failed to promote the development of a local VC sector. To Gilson (2003) in Teubal (2006:1492) , the lack of local market-tested SU/VC during the early 90s to partner with foreign based VCs as well as SUs, VCs and risk capital harmonisation challenges created problems to the emergence of the SU/VC sector. Yozma program and funds, however, provided the much needed assurance to the pre-emergence period`s financial demands which program led to profitability, brighter future, that inspired new VC market entrants and growth.
Yozma, however, first targeted current SUs and thereafter catered for new SUs that came into being as a result of an expanded VC market and the late development VC enlargement was as a result of potential and current SUs while the formation of new SUs was as a result of both current and potential future VCs. Yozma program was a perfect and successful example of policy targeting by the Israeli Government. 
Israeli Policy Targeting
CONCLUSION
This article has examined how Israel has managed to develop a competitive advantage through SUs and VC. The SU world houses an industry of ideas, providing mankind with cutting-edge solutions to everyday problems. Critical to the success of Israel`s SU and VC market was government policy intervention, SU and VC co-evolution as well SU development and funding policies among others. The article highlighted major critical areas towards developing a competitive advantage through SUs and VC. The article provides a strong argument for developing competitive advantage through SUs and VC considering the contributions of the SU and VC market to the Israeli economy since 1948. This article has proved how critical is this sector in attracting FDI. There are a number of direct and indirect economic benefits of adopting such a policy. The Israeli SU/VC cluster became a critical foundation for major breakthroughs in many fields across the country.
Israel became one of the few countries with a lead density of SUs and VCs in the globe. It boasts of over 3000 high-tech firms, 80 of which are among those on the New York Stock exchange a number that far exceeds Japan, South Korea, Germany, France, India, Singapore and Hong Kong combined. Israeli firms` total market capitalisation on the NASDAQ exchange was in excess of USD85 billion as of 2015. Israel`s VC industry and SU-intensive cluster represent exceptional development success stories since 1969. These events are a helpful source of ideas in policy formulation especially in Africa. This will help develop an African competitive advantage, that is, Agenda 2063.
In summary, the following are some of the factors that are believed to be behind the successful emergence of Israel`s VC market and a SU-intensive cluster that can help transform many Emerging economies.
• Spending on R&D: Israel has become a global leader in R&D spending. It has become a powerhouse to reckon with in R&D. Israel spent approximately 4.2% of its GDP towards R&D in 2013 which is a significant amount greater than Japan, USA, China and India which spent 3.4%, 2.4%, 1.9% and 0.85% respectively during the same period. This shows Israel`s strength that is powered by its R&D hubs as well as its technological institutions that ranks first in global achievements as recorded in the WEF Global Competitiveness yearbook of 2013. Israel also boasts of having many per capita engineers, scientists, technicians as well as PhD holders the world over. It also ranks 3 rd and 4 th respectively in scientific support and state of the art technology infrastructure. The Israeli government strongly supports fundamental and applied research with a high potential for commercialization through a number of policy initiatives.
• Hi-Tech "Iron Triangle": Israel ranks first in know-how transfer and among the top ten in industry and academic cooperation. The country has also managed to formulate stimulating innovative structures that are effective and efficient. Israel`s three legged approach to economic development and growth saw the creation of a high-technology triangle that helps convert innovative ideas into great companies that have provided breakthroughs in some of the world`s challenges. This has also helped Israel earning the much needed FDI net inflows. Israel is currently earning around USD25 billion in technological exports annually through these dynamics (Shkedi, 2015) .
• High Quality University System -S&T Excellence: A well-educated workforce is an absolutely critical pre-condition for the development of any technology cluster. To Maune (2015:182) , Israel has managed to mould a people of high academic prowess that is incomparable globally. This has been made possible through SETI initiative (Science, Engineering, Technology, and Innovation) (Maune, 2016 nd respectively. Israel also boasts of 12 Nobel Prize winners. These are in the field of Chemistry (6), Peace (3), Economics (2) and Literature (1). This is an indicative of the Israeli brains as well as institutions of high quality.
• Government Support (OCS): The Encouragement of Industrial R&D Act of 1984. According to Shkedi (2015:3) , the Act "constitutes the general mandate of the OCS." The Israeli government through the OCS has unveiled a number of SU/VC support programs and channels. These support initiatives were home grown programs that were tailored to support Israel`s SU/VC cluster. These channels included; Tnufa Program, Magnet Program, the R&D Fund, and Global Enterprise Collaboration Program among others. The OCS also unveiled a number of bilateral financing initiatives meant to support the Israeli cause, which became conditional grants. The funds became loans on commercial success while the funds are forfeited on non-commercialisation or failure of the project. The OCS further unveiled the Technology Incubation Program to provide beginner entrepreneurs with ground-breaking ideas or projects to transmute them into reality. Israel had around 20 incubators as of 2015 specialising in different areas across the whole country with around 160 firms at different R&D stages. Israel`s OCS budgetary support, however, declined by 7.9% since 2009 to approximately USD395 million as of 2013.
• Development of VC market/industry: While countries can develop SUs without VC, clearly the most innovative clusters are tightly linked to thriving VC markets. The development of a VC market in Israel dramatically increased the growth rate of SUs and transformed Israel into a Silicon Wadi. Israel managed to attain its current status, the Innovation Nation because of the SU&VC coevolution. This has proved very critical towards the development of a viable SU-intensive cluster.
• Strong community/diaspora: The Israeli example also shows the importance of developing a strong global community of Israeli nationals or people sympathetic to Israel (overseas Jews).
Without the global Jewish community, Israel would likely not have received as much FDI as it did and its companies would certainly have been more hampered in their ability to establish operations in overseas markets. The Israeli example shows that if countries can develop a strong enough community and sense of loyalty, many overseas nationals can significantly aid the development of local SU clusters by returning to their country of origin or by supporting cluster development in their adopted countries.
• Return on Government Investment: The Israeli government shows that sustained R&D investment is correlated with technological success. However, it would be assuming too much to suggest that direct funding on specific companies was a key success factor. To Berry and Grayeff (2009) cited by Maune (2015:180) argue that Israel`s R&D investment policy achievements have been realised through many ways across the country. To Saul Lach of the Hebrew University, a quantitative base to demonstrate Israel`s R&D policy return on investment in high-technology shows average returns between 473% and 1000%. On a broader perspective, government has achieved a lot through the creation of a vibrant high-technology SU and VC cluster. Four thousand high-technology firms were formed by 1993 placing Israel on second position after the USA in firm concentration. High-technology firms became the highest employer in the economy with an approximate figure around 250, 000 36 employees as of 2014 while in 2007 had a share of 9%. The presence of MNCs as shown in table 2 above indicates Israel`s industrial strength as these MNCs are critical to economic development and growth in a number of ways.
• Military spill-over: Israel was successful because they allowed spill-over from University and military research. The military has played a pivotal transformational role in Israel through R&D. Peled (2001) cited in Maune (2015:186) claims that the Israeli Defence Forces as well as the Ministry of Defence provide cutting edge breeding space that is critical to high-technology formation and development. These trainings have proved critical in many commercial set ups. The Israeli Defence Forces has also proved critical in fostering Israel`s technocrats with multitasking skills that is a surprise to many the world over. See Dvir and Tishler (1999) and Maune (2015) for some of the high-technology firms founded former military personnel.
• Technology Transfer Organizations (TTO): The efficient technological transfer as well as its commercial apparatus have become the key drivers in Israel`s technological innovative capacity. The three legged approach became critical in the commercialisation of Israel`s scientific thoughts. The following are some of the lead companies that drive the TTO agenda; Yissum Ltd. (Hebrew University of Jerusalem), Ramot (Tel Aviv University), Yeda R&D Company Ltd. (Weizmann Institute of Science), BGN Technologies (Ben-Gurion University) and the T3 -Technion Technology Transfer (Technion). The TTOs cooperated to create an association with 12 partners. It must be noted that these TTOs have produced satisfactory results in the past, for example, the Ramot has generated 65 SUs as well as registering more than 70 patents per year. At the current moment there are 300 additional commercial patents waiting to be patented (Shkedi, 2015) .
